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Abstract: 
This thesis tries to find out the relation between restructuring methods of Chinese state-
owned enterprises (SOE) before their share issue privatization (SIP) and corporate 
performance after share issue based on an empirical study on H shares and Red Chips on 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. We collected data of 58 state-owned enterprises listed as 
H-share or Red Chip on Hong Kong stock market and divided them into two main 
groups 'complete restructuring' and 'incomplete restructuring' and four sub-groups 
pursuant to their different restructuring methods. We examined the corporate 
performance changes of whole sample and sub-groups and found that SIP is effective in 
improving SOEs，output, ROA and decreasing leverage ratio. However, it's not 
successful in enhancing ROS and corporate efficiency. We cannot find the obvious 
relation between restructuring method and corporate performance. There's no significant 
evidence to show that corporate performance of completely restructured SOEs is better 
than incompletely restructured SOEs on Hong Kong stock market. These results are 
different from the conclusions reached in early literature. He, Deng and Gan (2006) 
found that corporate performance has no significant variation after SIP and profitability 
decrease obviously. They also found out corporate performance of SOEs restructured 
completely is better than those restructured incompletely by examining samples of China 
A-share stock market. They argued that financial report modification before IPO and 
large shareholder's expropriation from the listed company through connected 
transactions lead to no significant increase and even decrease in corporate performance 
and complete restructuring method, by separating original parent SOE and listed 
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company validly avoid large shareholder's expropriation from the listed company. The 
different results in my thesis possibly suggest that strict regulations and supervisions 
governing connected transactions and information exposure on Hong Kong stock market 
decrease the degree of financial report modification before IPO and large shareholder's 
expropriation from the listed company, and consequently corporate performance 
improves for whole sample and restructuring methods are irrelevant to corporate 
performance after IPO. 
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Since early 1990s, China government began to reform the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) by share issue privatization (SIP). Large scales of SOEs are listed on the two 
domestic stock exchanges (Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange) 
as A-shares and B-shares. Meanwhile a few large-sized SOEs with good corporate 
performance were selected by local and central government to be listed on Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange as H-share or Red Chip. Large volumes of literature have 
done research on the impact of share issue privatization on firm performance and 
results are mixed. By examining Chinese domestic stock market Sun and Tong (2003) 
have found share issue privatization is effective in improving earning ability, real 
sales and labor productivity whereas there's no improvement in profit returns and 
leverage ratio. To further explore the underlying reasons which have influence on 
corporate performance after SIP, He, Deng and Gan (2006) examined the relation 
between pre-privatization restructuring methods and corporate performance after SIP 
under the context of Chinese domestic stock market from 1997 to 2000. In China all 
SOEs have to be restructured from traditional SOEs into share holding companies 
that is to write off non-core business to prepare for public listing. Some firms were 
restructured through 'complete restructuring' and others through 'incomplete 
restructuring'. 'Complete restructuring' refers to those listed corporations relatively 
independent of former parent SOEs. The non-core business and related assets and 
liabilities are put into a new independent firm which has no direct relation with listed 
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firms. In contrast by incomplete restructuring parent SOE with written-off non-core 
business can control listed company through being the single largest shareholder of 
the company. They found that incomplete pre-privatized restructuring firms 
under-perform the completely restructured firms after IPO and they argued that the 
large shareholders' expropriation owing to the pre-privatized restructuring methods 
and lack of regulations and supervisions results in no significant improvement in 
corporate performance after SIP. They empirically demonstrate that the incentives 
and ability of the large shareholders' expropriation depend critically on the firms' 
organizational forms which are shaped by restructuring process before initial public 
offerings. Compared with China domestic stock market, Hong Kong stock market is 
the most important international market for Chinese SOEs to raise international funds. 
The China-related stocks listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange are called as H-share 
and Red Chip. H-share is the company incorporated in China and approved by China 
Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) for listing on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. Red-Chips refer to companies incorporated in Hong Kong or overseas and 
have at least 35% shareholding held in aggregate by Mainland China entities, and/or 
indirectly through companies controlled by them, with the Mainland China entities 
being the single largest shareholders. This paper tries to examine the effect of SIP on 
corporate performance of SOEs listed on Hong Kong stock market and the relation 
between pre-privatization restructuring methods and corporate performance after SIP 
under the context of Hong Kong stock market. 
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We collect the data of Chinese SOEs having initial public offerings (IPO) on Hong 
Kong stock market from 1997 to 2005. In accordance with restructuring methods 
these companies are divided into two main groups, 'complete restructuring' and 
'incomplete restructuring' and four sub-groups 'complete restructuring' 
'multi-company restructuring' 'wholly carve-out restructuring' 'partially carve-out 
restructuring'. For each firm accounting data of 6 years is obtained, 3 years before 
IPO and three years after IPO. By univariate and multivariate analysis we find that 
increase in output, profitability (ROA) and decrease in leverage ratio are significant 
whereas there's no significant improvement in ROS and efficiency. We also find that 
state-owned enterprises in complete restructuring sub-group don't show better 
performance than those in incomplete restructuring sub-group. We cannot find 
evidence that complete restructuring is superior to incomplete restructuring by 
examining H-share and Red chips. These results are different from the conclusions 
reached in early literature. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses background of Chine reforms 
on state-owned enterprises and review relevant literatures. Section 3 describes data 
and methodology. Section 4 presents the main empirical results to address the 
questions raised earlier. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Background and Literature Review 
Under the old system of high centralization and planned economic system, Chinese 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) were plagued by persistent inefficiency, low 
profitability and substantial deficits. From early 1980s China began to reform its 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in a gradual approach to enhance their productivity 
and profitability. According to Liu and Gao (1999), the reform process have four 
stages. The first stage ran from 1979 to 1983 with the main goal to decentralize 
administrative authority and increase profitability (fangquan rangli). This reform 
undesirably led to a result of motivating SOEs to hide profit from government and 
caused decline in government revenue. From 1983 to 1987 the second stage called 
bogaidai began. That was to replace government allocation of capital to SOEs by 
bank loans. Unfortunately it resulted in huge 'triangular debt' problem that plagued 
SOE reform. These problems led to the third stage of the reform process which 
focused on the separation of government ownership from control of SOEs' 
operations which is called chengbaozhi. However, with the reform undergoing new 
problems emerged. These problems resulted from two main reasons. One is that these 
SOEs were lack of clear allocation of property right. The other is that these 
corporations bear heavy policy burdens and social responsibility like social security, 
housing and education. In 1992 the Party Congress began the fourth stage of 
SOE reform that was corporatization (gongsihua). Small and weak medium-sized 
SOEs were sold off through auctions and corporate transformation while large ones 
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were transformed into publicly listed firms on stock market and still under control of 
government through being the largest single shareholder. Share issue privatization 
(SIP) has become an important way to reform SOEs by Chinese government. Two 
stock exchanges, Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange were 
established in early 1990s. Large scales of SOEs are listed on these two domestic 
stock exchanges as A-shares and B-shares. Meanwhile a few large-sized SOEs with 
good corporate performance were selected by local and central government to be 
listed on Hong Kong Stock Exchange as H-share or Red Chip. 
Hong Kong Stock market is one of the most established stock market in the world, 
classified by the International Finance Corporation as a developed market. In 2006 
the total market capitalization went up to 12729 billion HK dollars, ranked the 
largest in the world. Hong Kong is the most important stock market for Chinese 
companies to raise international funds. The China-related stocks listed on Hong 
Kong Stock Exchange are called as H-share and Red Chip. H-share is company 
incorporated in China and approved by CSRC for listing on Hong Kong Stock 
Exchange. The per value of the shares of these Chinese enterprises is denominated in 
RMB and the shares are subscribed for and traded in HKD or other currencies (HK 
Stock Exchange). H-shares are issued by Chinese companies which may or may not 
have also issued A-shares (Aharony and Wong, 2000). The first H-share was Tsingtao 
Brewery, which was listed in 1993. Red-Chips refer to companies incorporated in 
Hong Kong or overseas and have at least 35% shareholding held in aggregate by 
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Mainland China entities, and/or indirectly through companies controlled by them, 
with the Mainland China entities being the single largest shareholders (HK Stock 
Exchange). Usually Red Chips companies were listed through the injection of 
Chinese assets into Hong Kong or overseas incorporated shell companies. The listing 
of domestic enterprises on HKEx must be approved by the Chinese Security 
Regulatory Committee (CSRC) and Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) in 
Hong Kong. Regulations of CSRC for getting listed on main board of HKEx include : 
total assets is not less than 400million RMB; net profit in the past year is not less 
than 60million RMB; equity funds raised by IPO is not less than US$50million 
adjusting to reasonable P/E ratio. HKEx regulates the qualification for listing is that 
the trading record of no less than three financial years during which the profit is not 
less than HK$20million in the most recent year and not less than HK$30million in 
aggregate in the two preceding years. The SOEs selected by the government to be 
listed on HKEx are always among the best former SOEs. Compliant with the 
legislations and regulations of CSRC and SFC, these state-owned enterprises have to 
be restructured into share holding companies before public listing in HKEx. Until 
2005, there are 209 China-affiliate corporations listed on HKEx in total as H-share 
and Red Chip, with 120 H-shares and 89 Red Chips. Market Capitalization of 
China-related stocks on Main Board increased from 4.78% of HKEx in 1993 to 
36.77% at the end of 2005 up to 2,926,328.58 million HK dollars. Equity fund raised 
by China-related stocks on main board reached 168,953.99 HK $mil in 2005 from 
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23,220.75 HK $mil in 1993. On Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) equity fund raised 
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by China-related stocks went up from 644.18 HK $mil in 2000 to 366.87 HK $mil in 
2005. Hang Seng China Enterprises Index (HSCEI) was launched as market 
capitalization weighted index for H shares and was comprised of 40 stocks at the end 
of 2005. Another China-related stock index, Hang Seng China-Affiliated 
Corporations Index (HSCCI), is the market capitalization weighted index for Red 
Chips and was comprised of 30 stocks at the end of 2005. 
Most of the Chine-related corporations listed on HKEx are born out of Chinese 
traditional SOE. Compliant with the legislations and regulations of CSRC and SFC, 
these state-owned enterprises have to be restructured into share holding companies 
before public listing in HKEx. Enterprise restructuring is a crucial step before 
Chinese SOEs list on HKEx. It involves both accounting and organizational changes. 
To attract international investors many SOEs carve out their profitable business units 
for public offerings and keep nonproductive and unprofitable units in the parent 
holding companies. Thus several different forms of pre-IPO restructuring emerged. 
They belong to two main forms. One can be termed as 'complete restructuring' and 
the other is 'incomplete restructuring'. Complete restructuring refers to those listed 
corporations relatively independent of former parent SOEs. In contrast by incomplete 
restructuring parent SOE can control listed company through being the single largest 
shareholder of the company. Regardless of restructuring form, the financial reports of 
the to-be-listed business units have to be converted in accordance with either 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) or the Hong Kong Statement of Standard 
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Accounting Practice (HKSSAP) (Aharony and Wong, 2000). Foreign auditors handle 
the financial statements of prospectus for H-share and Red Chip firms. It increases 
the credibility of audited financial statements. Hong Kong stock market is 
well-established and market regulations mechanisms are more mature than China 
domestic stock market. Regulations governing listed companies require each 
company should have at least two independent non-executive directors on all boards 
and these independent directors must be clearly identified and disclosed. Regulations 
also require listed company to disclose related-party transactions to the shareholders 
within three weeks of notifying stock exchange (HK Stock Exchange). In this paper 
we try to examine whether different restructuring forms of these SOEs shaped by 
privatization process influence corporate performance after IPO under the context of 
Hong Kong stock market. 
Large volumes of literature have done research on the impact of SIP on firm 
performance across both market reforms and transitional economies. Some studies 
show that privatization is necessary for significant performance improvement 
(Vining and Boardman 1991; Maxim Boycko, Shleifer, and Robert Vishny 1994, 
1996a，b; and Shleifer 1997.) and SOEs' productivity has been significantly improved 
by SIP (Groves et al., 1994; Cornelli and Li, 1997). Others argue that competition 
and deregulation are more important than privatization in corporate performance 
improvement (John Kay and D.J. Thompson 1986; Matthew Bishop and Kay 1989; 
John Vickers and Yarrow 1991; Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale 1999) and the SIP 
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reform is far from successful (Lin et al. 1998). Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh 
(1994) examine how privatization affects corporate performance via SIP by 
comparing pre- vs post-privatization performance of 61 companies from 18 countries 
and 32 industries from 1961-89. They found that that privatization is associated with 
improvement in the operating and financial performance of divested firm. Some 
studies also test the effect of privatization on corporate performance in transition 
economy. The studies (Dyck 1997; Weiss and Nikitin 1998; Claessens and Djankov 
1999; Frydman, Hessel, and Rapaczynski 1999) regarding the impact of privatization 
on corporate performance in central and Eastern Europe show that private ownership, 
foreign ownership, firm-level restructuring and hiring new managers are associated 
with post-privatization performance improvement. China privatization process differs 
from many other pre-socialism countries in key respects. The government has played 
an important role in the reform process. To conform to the communist public 
ownership principle the government retains a substantial portion of ownership of 
privatized enterprises with the state being the largest single block holder in most 
SOEs. Sun and Tong (2003) have examined the effect of SIP on corporate 
performance in Chinese domestic stock market and found SIP is effective in 
improving earning ability, real sales and labor productivity whereas there's no 
improvement in profit returns and leverage ratio. He, Deng and Gan (2006) 
examined the relationship between pre-privatization restructuring methods and 
corporate performance after SIP under the context of Chinese domestic stock market. 
They found that incomplete pre-privatized restructuring firms under-perform the 
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completely restructured firm after IPO. Besides, they argued that the problems, such 
as internal related transactions and the largest shareholder expropriating minority 
shareholders originate in the pre-privatized restructuring methods and degrees. This 
paper tries to examine the effect of SIP on corporate performance on Hong Kong 
stock market and the relationship between pre-privatization restructuring methods 
and corporate performance after SIP under the context of Hong Kong stock market. 
Do different methods impact the incentives of the largest shareholder and corporate 
performance? Under the strict accounting and reporting exposure regulation of Hong 
Kong stock market, do the problems, such as the largest shareholder expropriating 
the minority shareholders emerging in domestic stock market still occur in H-shares 
and Red Chips companies listed on Hong Kong stock market? 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data Description 
Our sample includes all state-owned enterprises listed as H-shares and Red Chips 
that went to public between 1997 and 2005. We focus on post-1997 because Hong 
Kong was handed over by Britain to China in 1997 and the territory was 
administered as a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of China. Large scale of 
SOEs went to public on Hong Kong stock market in 1997 and afterwards, and 
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therefore our sample is representative of SOEs listed as H-share and Red Chip. 
We collect the restructuring and financial information of pre-privatization SOEs from 
IPO prospectus. The prospectus of SOEs listed from 1997 to 2002 was obtained from 
CD-ROM database Hong Kong Listed Companies: Corporate Documents. This 
database is published annually by Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The prospectus of 
companies listed as H-share and Red Chip after 2002 was obtained from website of 
Hong Kong Stock Exchange. The prospectus involves information on the history of 
the company, restructuring method, shareholders information, ownership structure 
and financial statement supposing the listed company existing three years before. We 
obtain three years' financial data (turnover, total assets, total liability, net income, 
EBIT, book value of equity) of all firms after IPO from Thomson. 
In Table 1, we report the sample summery statistics. There are 58 firms in the sample. 
These firms have complete pre-IPO and after IPO accounting data. Those firms 
without complete accounting data are excluded from sample. According to different 
restructuring forms, we divide them into two main groups and four sub-groups. 
Among total 58 firms 12 firms went to public through 'complete restructuring', the 
others through 'incomplete restructuring'. Original SOEs always carve out their core 
business and best part of old firms to go to public. By complete restructuring the new 
listed company is relatively independent of original SOEs which remain non-core 
business part. For example, the restructuring plan of original China Construction 
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Bank separates the business, asset and liability into two companies, the listed China 
Construction Bank and Jianyin. The listed China Construction Bank holds the 
commercial banking business and related assets and liabilities. Jianyin remains 
non-commercial banking business and related assets and liabilities. They have no 
direct relationship although Huijin becomes the largest shareholder of these two 
companies. Incomplete restructuring involves two concrete forms, 'multi-company 
restructuring \ 'carve-out restructuring'. In our sample 46 firms went to public 
through incomplete restructuring, among them 8 firms were classified as 
'multi-company restructuring‘ form and the left 38 firms are 'carve-out 
restructuringBy incomplete restructuring parent SOE holding non-core business 
and related assets can control listed company through being the single largest 
shareholder of the company. 'Multi-company restructuring' means several SOEs put 
their business into one new company and list it on the stock market. The listed 
corporate is controlled by one or more original SOEs. 'Carve-out restructuring' SOEs 
can be divided into two categories further, that is 'wholly carve-out restructuring ‘ 
and 'partially carve-out restructuringIn case the SOEs carve out all of their 
operating business to be listed and parent companies only keep excess workers, 
obsolete plants and financial and social liabilities, we term it as wholly carve-out 
restructuring. In our sample there are 11 firms going to public through wholly 
carve-out restructuring. In case that the SOEs just carve out part of their business or 
their business in several regions to be listed and parent company remains the left 
operating business, we call it 'partially carve-out restructuring'. We take China 
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Telecom as example. Original China Telecom Group just carves out its telecom 
business in three provinces-Guangdong Province, Zhejiang Province and Jiangsu 
Province to be listed on HKEx. The parent group keeps operating telecom business 
in the left 17 provinces. Some companies carve out their most profitable business of 
certain industry to be listed and leaving business of other industries in original 
company. In our sample 'partially carve-out restructuring' group includes 27 firms. 
3.2 Methodology 
We follow existing studies as D'Souza and Megginson (1999), Sun and Tong (2003), 
He, Deng and Gan (2006) and compare performance changes three years before and 
three years after privatization. We calculate average value of three years before and 
three years after respectively for each firm. We measure corporate performance by 
output, profitability, efficiency and leverage. We use ROA and ROS as proxy for 
profitability, sales per employee, net income per employee, and sales-asset ratio (S/A) 
as measures for corporate efficiency. Debt to asset ratio is used to measure leverage. 
We don't involve ROE as proxy to measure profitability variation because under 
primary offerings SIP will increase the firm's equity accounts and ROE will decrease 
after the share issue even if net income remains constant (Sun and Tong, 2003). We 
measure ROE of the whole sample and find that ROE has significant decrease after 
IPO. However, we involve ROA as proxy because total liability may decrease 
although equity amount increase total asset. The aggregate result in total asset is 
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mixed. 
(1) Univariate analysis 
We compute mean and median of each proxy for each group over the pre- and 
post-privatization periods. We obtain financial data with a seven-year window for 
each firm, three years before IPO and three years after IPO. Then we calculate the 
average value of three years before IPO and after IPO respectively. For those 
companies which are listed less than three years, we use two years' or one year's 
value as value after IPO. Year 0 is excluded from the calculations as it includes both 
the public and private ownership phases of the enterprise. We also adjust the 
variables in accordance with industries. For example, 
Mdj_sales..=[saleSy,,一isalesj)_[sales>j.,-x一isalesj,-) where isdeSu 
is the output in industry j, ij refer to stock i in the jth industry; t represents the current 
year and t-1 represents the year before, hales is the weighted average of the sales of 
all H shares and Red Chips in the same industry. 
Wilcoxon signed-rank test is used to test any significant difference in the median 
changes for the pre- and post privatization period. T-value is used to test the 
significant difference in mean change of the variable values. 
(2) Regression Approach 
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If any proxy of the change in corporate performance is significant, we use a 
regression approach to further explore the impacts of these factors on changing 
corporate performance over time. We use performance change as dependent variables. 
We estimate the following model: 
= « + p^Dimy + P.Dum^ + p^ST + p^HR + P^Size + j3^Leverage + j3^Dum. + s. 
The sign ‘A’ is the difference in the three-year average of performance proxy before 
and after privatization. Dum^ is the dummy variable indicating restructuring form. 
Dum^ takes the value of one if the firm is completely restructured and zero otherwise. 
Durric is the dummy variable indicating concrete forms of carve-out restructuring. 
Dum^ takes the value of one if the firm is carve-out restructured and zero otherwise. 
The ownership variables, ST, HR are the fractions of share owned respectively by 
state, H share or Red Chip holders. State shares refer to the part of shares owned by 
central government, local government or the parent state-owned enterprises. The left 
part of shares is held by legal person holder, foreign holder or employee holder. This 
part accounts for small proportion and is taken as a whole. Size is the natural 
logarithm of total assets as size proxy. Leverage is the total debt ratio which control 
for leverage effect. Dum. represents industry type (industrials, finance, 
consolidated,) of the stock. 
Large quantities of researches indicate that the private stock ownership is more 
efficient than the national stock ownership mainly because the private stock 
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ownership may better deal with the relations of the agency by agreement and may 
provide efficient observation of the manager's behaviors (Boardman and Vining, 
1989; Dewenter and Malatesta, 2001). D'Souza and Megginson (1999) find that the 
increasing degree of sales income and that of the per capita sales income of the 
samples of the control privatization is higher than those of the samples of the revenue 
privatization, but they don't find any evident difference between the two groups of 
samples in regard to the increase of profit-earning ability. D'Souza, Megginson and 
Nash (2000) find that the larger proportion the country reserves stock ownership, the 
faster the profit-earning ability grows; the higher the foreign-funded stock ownership 
is, the faster the per capita sales income grows. Frydman, Gray, Hessel and 
Rapaczynski (1999) indicate that the nature of the stock ownership has an important 
influence on the privatization; only when the stock is controlled by the external 
stock-holders instead of internal stock-holders is the privatization efficient. Since the 
issue of privatization in China is partial privatization and the country takes a large 
proportion of the stock, the company is still controlled by the government. Therefore, 
we consider the influence of the structure of the stock ownership on the efficiency of 
the privatization instead of that of nature of controlling right on the efficiency of the 
privatization. 
Large quantities of studies demonstrate that private enterprises generally carried out 
earning management before IPO and thus decrease the performance of the company 
after the issue (Jain and Kini, 1994). Dewenter and Malatesta (2001) also believe that 
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state-owned enterprises might as well conduct earning management before the issue, 
such as advanced confirmation of revenue and retarded confirmation of cost. Titman 
and Trueman (1986) thinks that auditing service of good quality may provide more 
reliable and more effective accounting information to potential investors and the 
reputation of auditing institutions guarantees the reliability of the accounting 
information. The studies conducted by Beatty (1989) and Feltham (1991) show that 
the accounting office could effectively decrease the information imbalance between 
issuing companies and investors and the unpredictability of the company's value. 
The higher its reputation is, the lower the restraining degree of new stocks becomes. 
Becke, Defond, Jiambalvo and Subramanyam (1998) believe that highly qualified 
auditors are more competent in discovering the problematic accounting practices. 
Once they find them out, they are likely to refuse to use them and they will give 
some auditing advices. Since almost all the SOEs listed as H-shares and Red Chips 
are audited by ‘Big Four', we believe the auditing service is of high quality and we 
don't involve dummy variable indicating different audit quality. 
4. Result 
4.1 Univariate analysis 
(1) Output Change 
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Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley (1992) state that the effective implementation of 
privatization will stimulate investment and bring forth new output augmentation. 
However, Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996) believe that after the privatization, the 
government will no longer guarantee the non-efficient high output level and this 
would reduce the output. We measure the output of the company via SALE and in 
order to iron out the influence of the inflation rate, we divide the SALE by CPI and 
then take the natural logarithm. 
Table 2 contains the data on sales change for whole sample and each sub-groups 
before and after industrial adjustment. It shows that the output of the state-owned 
enterprises is significantly increased after the privatization regardless of restructuring 
form before industrial adjustment. Almost all Wilcoxon and T tests are significant at 
1% level. For whole sample the average number of the SALE is 4.166 (4.085) before 
the privatization and it becomes 4.584 (4.501) after it, thus an augmentation of 0.417 
(0.417) occurs. The result after the industrial adjustment doesn't show the obvious 
increase, which is contradictory to the findings of Megginson, Nash and 
Randenborgh (1994)，Boubakri and Cosset (1998), D'Souza and Megginson (1999)， 
Sun and Tong (2003) and Gupta (2005) and He, Deng and Gan (2006). The sample in 
complete restructuring group even show decrease in sales, albeit it's not significant. 
In the sample, the SALEs of the completely restructuring samples and the 
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incompletely restructuring samples both before the industrial adjustment are 
obviously increased after IPO and both Wilcoxon and T tests show that the result are 
significant at 1% level. However, after industrial adjustment neither group has 
significant increase after IPO and complete restructuring group even has decrease in 
mean value of sales. For the subgroups of concrete restructuring forms, the SALE of 
the incompletely revised samples before the industrial adjustment is obviously 
increased after the IPO, but that after the industrial adjustment is not obviously 
increased and neither Wilcoxon nor T tests show that the result has surpassed 1% 
level. Sun and Tong (2003) point out some or the entire rise may be the result of 
price increases in the industry and industrial development rather than sales unit 
increase. It can explain why the increase in sales is not significant after industrial 
adjustment. He, Deng and Gan (2006) tested the sample of SOEs listed on China A 
share stock market and found that sales of completes restructuring SOEs has 
significantly increase before and after industrial adjustment while sales of incomplete 
restructuring firms does not. By testing H shares and Red Chips sample we have 
different results. 
(2) Profitability Change 
We describe the profitability of the company via two variables: (1) ROS, the ratio of 
net income to sales (2) ROA, the ratio of net income to total assets. As this is the first 
time the privatization is issued publicly in China, it is inevitable that the assets, 
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generally in the form of bank savings in the balance sheet, are increased after the 
issue. The study carried out by Aharony, Lee and Wong (2000) regulates the total 
assets of the IPO in the previous and the following year and the formula of regulation 
is the total amount of assets at the end of the year minus monetary funds at the end of 
the year, for they believe that the regulation of the total amount of assets at the end of 
the year reflects more precisely the part of the total assets that really takes part in the 
business of the company. Therefore, a similar regulation is conducted in this study. 
Table 3 presents the results on ROA change. For the whole sample the median and 
mean increase from 0.044 (0.057) before privatization to 0.052 (0.070) before 
industrial adjustment. The t-test on mean change is not significant while the 
wilcoxon test on median change is significant at 5%. The mean of ROA for the 
complete restructuring subgroup decreases albeit the result is not significant. For the 
incomplete restructuring group and carve-out subgroup median and mean of ROA 
increase and both wilcoxon test and t test are significant at 5% level. However, we 
notice that after industrial adjustment ROA of whole sample, incomplete sub-group 
and carve-out sub-group increase significantly, which conforms to the conclusion 
discovered by Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh (1994), Boubakri and Cosset 
(1998), D'Souza and Megginson (1999) and Gupta (2005) that the company's 
profitability is evidently increased after the issue of privatization, but different from 
the discovery of Dewenter and Malatesta (2001). For instance, for whole sample 
ROA after the industrial adjustment increases from 0.033 (0.033) to 0.036 (0.058) 
2 0 
and t-test is significant at 5% level and wilcoxon test is significant at 1% level. For 
the complete restructuring group the change in ROA doesn't show significantly 
increase. This hints at the possibility that the capital raised by IPO increase firms' 
asset on average dramatically while the net income doesn't increase as significant as 
asset. That may explain why ROA before industrial adjustment doesn't change 
significantly. However, after ironing out industrial average level of asset we can find 
ROA increases significantly. 
Table 3 presents the result on ROS change. For almost all samples it doesn't show 
significantly increase or decrease after IPO. After industrial adjustment we can see 
the average value of whole sample, complete restructuring sample, incomplete 
restructuring sample and carve-out restructuring sample decrease albeit it's not 
significant. For instance for whole sample the median (mean) ROS changes from 
0.092 (0.056) to 0.058 (0.012), reduced by -0 .035 (-0.044) . For complete 
restructuring group, the median (mean) decreases from 0.053(0.145) to 0.020(0.088). 
We observe significant increase in sales while there's no increase but even decrease 
in ROS. This may due to the increase in sales faster than the increase in earnings 
after IPO. 
He, Deng and Gan(2006) found that in either completely or incompletely 
restructuring samples, the ROS and ROA both before and after the industrial 
regulation are obviously reduced by testing SOEs listed on China A share market. 
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However, we find different change direction of ROA and ROS by testing firms listed 
as H-shares and Red Chips. ROA increases while ROS decreases after industrial 
adjustment. 
(3) Efficiency Change 
The personnel redundancy is a typical problem generally existent in state-owned 
enterprises and the deficiency of state-owned enterprises is partially due to the fact 
that the government demands the state-owned enterprises to employ more people 
than necessary and charges them to pay the pension and welfare allowance (residence, 
medical care, children's education, etc.)； it is possible that these problems be 
efficiently solved after the privatization. Meanwhile, after the privatization the 
companies will use more efficiently their employees, funds and technological 
resources owing to the reduction of the governmental subsidy and the clear 
comprehension of the economic goals (Kikeri, Nellis and Shirley, 1992; Boycko, 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1996). 
We examine the variation of the business efficiency before and after the issue of 
privatization, including per capita income (S/E), per capita profit (I/E) and sales to 
asset ratio (S/A). We divide the SALE, total amount of pre-tax profit by employees. 
However, the firm-level employee figures are very difficult to get. Since it is hard to 
obtain the data of the number of employees in the company and we are only 
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accessible to the number of employees in some of the state-owned enterprises of the 
preceding year of the issue of privatization, we are only able to compare the number 
of employees and the business efficiency of the preceding year of the issue of 
privatization with the average number of those of the three years following it. We 
only have 42 firms that have both employment figures before IPO and after IPO. For 
the 42 firms, we find the median employment figure increase from 4116 before 
privatization to 4565 after privatization and the mean of employment increase from 
23217 to 27969. And these changes are not significant. Thus, we don't list the 
concrete result of employment figures change. 
In Table 4，for whole group both per capita income (S/E) and per capita profit (I/E) 
are not significantly increase after IPO. However, for completely restructuring group 
and wholly restructuring group the per capita income (S/E) is evidently increased 
after the issue of privatization. For completely restructuring group the median and 
mean value before the issue is 470.331 (699.580) and becomes 605.543 (879.501) 
after it, an increase of 135.212 (179.921) occurs. Both Wilcoxon and T tests show 
that the result is significant. For wholly carve-out restructuring form the median and 
mean value before the issue is 428.066 (415.417) and becomes 789.804(791.666) 
after it, an increase of 361. 737(376.249) occurs. Both Wilcoxon and T tests show 
that the result is significant at 1% level. However, the per capita profit (I/E) 
significantly decrease for complete restructuring group and increase for incompletely 
restructuring subgroup and carve-out subgroup. This result is consistent to the 
2 3 
variation in ROS. We observe significant increase in sales while there's no increase 
but even decrease in earnings after IPO. That may lead to increase in S/E but 
decrease in I/E. The variation of S/A ratio does not significantly increase or decrease. 
There's no obviously variation in asset utility efficiency. 
(4) Leverage Change 
Since the government will no longer provide security for debts, which gives rise to 
the increase of the debt cost, the privatization of state-owned enterprises will lead to 
the decrease of the debt level of the company (Megginson, Nash and Randenborgh, 
1994). In addition, the entry of the funds collected from IPO will also ameliorate the 
capital structure of the company. We compare the variation of the capital structure 
before and after the issue of privatization and measure the debt level by dividing the 
total debts by the total assets. Table 5 shows that the debt rate is evidently decreased 
both before and after the industrial adjustment. For example, the debt rate for whole 
samples before the industrial adjustment is 66.9%(62%) before the issue of 
privatization and becomes 43.7% (45.7%) after it, a decrease of 23.2%(16.3%) 
occurs. Both Wilcoxon and T tests show that the result is significant at 1% level. 
Similar conclusions are drawn from other sub-samples under different restructuring 
methods. 
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4.2 Multivariate analysis 
Besides univariate analysis, we also conduct multivariate analysis on the factors 
which influence the corporate performance. In our multivariate analysis, the 
dependent variables are ASALE, AROA and ADEBT, other variable like AROS, 
AS/E, Al/E, and AS/A aren't involved as a result of no significant variation in 
univariate analysis. 
In Table 6, we cannot find that, on the basis of the control of other factors, the 
complete reconstruction of state-owned enterprises is an important factor 
contributing to increase in sales and profitability, albeit it influences debt variation. 
The complete restructuring form plays an evidently positive role in the decrease of 
debt ratio. In terms of sales and ROA, the variation in corporate performance of the 
completely reconstructed state-owned enterprises isn't superior to that of 
incompletely reconstructed state-owned enterprises. We find no evidence of obvious 
relation between the effect of the privatization issue and other variables such as the 
stock ownership, firm size and industry classification. The intercepts of the 
regressions on the change in sales, ROA and leverage ratio are not significant neither. 
To avoid correlation between variables, we examine complete dummy, ST, HR and 
asset in separate regression. Unfortunately, the coefficients in all these regressions 
are not statistically significant. Thus, original result is kept here. 
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The state-ownership variable ST has negative coefficients in Sale and Leverage ratio 
regression albeit it isn't significant statistically. This may suggest that the proportion 
of state-share has negative effect on corporate performance. Restructuring form 
dummy variables have mixed results. Both complete dummy and carve-out dummy 
have negative effect on sales change and positive impacts on leverage ratio change. 
The t-value of coefficient of leverage ratio is significant at 5% level. This suggests 
that complete restructuring form tend to decrease leverage ratio after IPO. 
From the univariate analysis we can find that for whole sample OUTPUT has 
significant increase before industrial adjustment, ROA increases significantly after 
industrial adjustment from 0.033 (0.033) to 0.036 (0.058), increased by 0.004(0.025)， 
leverage ratio decreases significantly before industrial adjustment and no significant 
variation in other variables. For the complete restructuring sub-group only the output 
and the efficiency proxy (S/E) increase significantly. For incomplete restructuring 
sub-group output, ROA and I/E increase significantly and leverage ratio has obvious 
decrease. For the carve-out restructuring sub-group the output and ROA increase 
obviously and leverage ratio decrease significantly. We found that the ROA of SOEs 
listed on Hong Kong Stock market as H shares and Red Chips increase after IPO. 
The corporate performance of SOEs in complete restructuring form isn't better than 
incomplete restructuring SOEs. By univariate and multivariate analysis we find that 
restructuring methods are not obviously relevant to corporate performance after IPO 
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as H share and Red Chips, which is different from the findings on China A share 
stock market. He, Deng and Gan(2006) find that corporate performance has no 
significant variation after IPO and profitability decrease obviously. They also find 
that restructuring method is related to corporate performance and complete 
restructuring is superior to incomplete restructuring method owing to better 
performance of complete restructuring SOEs after IPO. They argue that financial 
report modification before IPO and large shareholder's expropriation from the listed 
company lead to no significant increase and even decrease in corporate performance. 
Since complete restructuring method separates original parent SOE and listed 
company, the SOEs restructured completely have better performance after IPO. By 
examining H-shares and Red Chips we find that corporate performance in terms of 
ROA increases for whole sample and restructuring methods are irrelevant to 
corporate performance after IPO as the corporate performance of SOEs in complete 
restructuring form don't have better performance than incomplete restructuring SOEs. 
Compared with SOEs listed as A-shares, we find that all SOEs listed as H-share and 
Red Chips are audited by ‘Big Four' accountant companies which guarantee the 
reliability of the accounting information. Their auditing service of high quality 
should be able to decrease the degree of the modification to the report and the 
earning management of state-owned enterprises before IPO. We also find that Hong 
Kong stock market has strict regulations governing connected transactions which are 
in Chapter 14 (Notifiable Transactions) of the Rules Governing the Listing of 
Securities in the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong Ltd (Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, 
2 7 
2002). The connected transactions are required to be notified to the public and the 
exchange. Thus, these valid regulations and supervision initiatives decrease the 
degree of financial report modification before IPO and large shareholder's 
expropriation from the listed company and consequently corporate performance in 
terms of ROA increases for whole sample and restructuring methods are irrelevant to 
corporate performance after IPO. 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine the change in corporate performance of state-owned 
enterprises listed as H-shares and Red Chips on Hong Kong stock market after their 
share issue privatization. We divide whole sample into sub-groups according to 
restructuring methods before IPO and try to find out relations between restructuring 
methods and corporate performance after IPO. Our results show that significant 
increase in sales and profitability (ROA) and decrease in leverage ratio for whole 
sample while no significant variation in ROS and corporate efficiency. State-owned 
enterprises in complete restructuring sub-group don't show better performance than 
those in incomplete restructuring sub-group. We cannot find evidence that complete 
restructuring is superior to incomplete restructuring by examining H-share and Red 
chips. These results are different from the conclusions reached in early literature. He, 
Deng and Gan (2006) found that corporate performance doesn't change significantly 
2 8 
after state-owned enterprises issue publicly. They also argued that corporate 
performance of SOEs restructured completely is better than those restructured 
incompletely by examining samples of China A-share stock market. These different 
findings possibly result from different market environment, regulations and 
supervisions. High quality service and credibility of accounting companies and strict 
regulations and supervisions by supervisory authority on Hong Kong stock market 
validly decrease the degree of financial report modification before IPO and large 
shareholder's expropriation from the listed company. In future, further research on 
connected transactions may be conducted to provide more direct evidence of impact 
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